New Zealand Law Society - Courts roundup 5 June - 11 June 2025
Decisions, proceedings and news from the courts in some common law jurisdictions in the past week.
Yoonwoo v Huh [2025] NZCA 209
Appellant Yoonwoo (Y) appealed decision of HC dismissing proceedings to enforce two judgments obtained against respondent Huh (H) in Republic of Korea on basis they were time barred – H bankrupt – Y sought permission to continue with appeal against H under s 76(2) Insolvency Act 2006 – Y was engaged in an apartment development in the Republic of Korea - H was one of the purchasers who failed to pay the deposit and purchase price required by the contracts – In 2010 Y brought proceedings against H and other purchasers before the Uijeongbu District Court in the Republic of Korea where two judgments were issued – H identified as a liable party in these judgments - Judgments were served for the purposes of enforcement in September 2014 - In April 2018 Y commenced proceedings in the New Zealand High Court against H to have the judgments recognised pursuant to the common law, as judgments from Korean courts are not capable of registration in New Zealand under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1934 - The Limitation Act 1950 applied given the date of the judgments - HC dismissed the claim as time-barred, finding that the six-year limitation period under s 4(1)(a) applied from 2010 when the judgments were given rather than the 12 year period under s 4(4) – An analysis of case law showed competing views in the authorities over whether claims to recognise foreign judgments should be treated as an “action on a judgment” under s 4(4) involving the longer limitation period (12 years) - Broader Parliament intention suggested that it was unlikely a longer and more generous limitation period was intended to apply for actions on judgments from countries not part of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1934 - Legislative intent had been made clearer with the enactment of the Limitation Act 2010 which eliminated the 12-year period in s 4(4) -
Permission to continue the appeal granted – Appeal dismissed - The six-year limitation period in s 4(1)(a) applied to the claim – The period began from the date the judgments were obtained - The action in New Zealand was taken outside that period.
R v R [2025] NZCA 210
E v R [2025] NZCA 214
Chief Executive of Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment v Hairland Holdings Limited [2025] NZCA 219
Appeal by Chief Executive of Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment (CE) on question of law – Whether the Employment Relations Authority (the Authority) had jurisdiction to hear an application, brought by a purported employer against the CE, the Labour Inspector and/or its workers, for a bare declaration that its workers are not employees under s 6(1) Employment Relations Act 2000 - Labour Inspector considered several hairstylists working in salons operated by respondent Hairland Holdings Ltd (HHL) were employees and had not received their minimum entitlements - Before the Labour Inspector took enforcement action, HHL applied to the Authority for a declaration that the hairstylists were not employees – The CE contended that the Authority did not have jurisdiction to make a bare declaration as to employment status - The Authority agreed - On a challenge to that determination, the Employment Court held the Authority had jurisdiction to determine HHL’s application under s 161(1)(c) Employment Relations Act 2000 –
The mere assertion by the Labour Inspector that the hairstylists are employees does not, in itself, give rise to an employment relationship problem for the purposes of s161(1) – HHL had no recourse to declaratory relief as to employment status in the absence of a live employment relationship problem – Labour Inspector’s assertion of an employment relationship has no practical effect unless proceedings are brought – The workers’ status will be a jurisdictional fact for the Labour Inspector to prove and which HHL can contest – HHL is not disadvantaged -
Appeal allowed – The Authority does not have jurisdiction to hear an application by an employer for a bare declaration that its workers are not employees.
R v Cook [2025] NZHC 1431 (30 May 2025) Becroft J
Sentencing – C sentenced after pleading guilty to murder, causing grievous bodily harm and assault with intent to injure – Had been drinking with associates at Māngere Town Centre Bus Station - Became highly intoxicated and fell asleep – Awoke highly agitated and became violent - First, C seriously assaulted associate who was left unconscious – Second, seriously assaulted murder victim – Assault included several full force punches to head and on victim’s head and body once victim knocked to ground – Victim later died in hospital from injuries – Third, assaulted brother who had also been drinking with C –
Life imprisonment with MPI 10.5 years imposed – Life imprisonment not manifestly unjust in circumstances – Offending did not reach threshold where life imprisonment with 17 years MPI necessary – Based on similar cases, 11-year MPI appropriate starting point for murder – Two-year increase in MPI for C’s other convictions, causing grievous bodily harm with intent to injure and assault with intent to injure – One-year reduction in MPI warranted for guilty plea – Further 18 months' reduction appropriate for C's personal circumstances – Reductions for youth and remorse declined.
R v Armon [2025] NZHC 1480 (5 June 2025) Grice J
Sentencing – A sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years MPI for murder of 78-year-old mother –
HC said provocation did not mitigate against life imprisonment despite conflicted relationship and mother’s belittling comments at time of offending (s 102 Sentencing Act 2002) – Circumstances of vulnerability and callousness present to high level engaging ss 104(1)(e) and (g) – Discount of two years to notional MPI of 17 years for early guilty plea reflecting remorse – Otherwise sentence would be manifestly unjust.
Waller-Edwards v One Savings Bank Plc [2025] UKSC (4 June 2025)
Successful appeal from CA – In 2011 W-E commenced relationship at point in life when emotionally vulnerable but financially independent as sole owner of mortgage-free home with substantial savings – W-E’s partner, B, persuaded W-E to exchange home and savings for property B building, which was already subject to existing charge - In 2013, B re-mortgaged property for £384,000 with One Savings Bank (Bank) - Bank understood re-mortgage to purchase another property for couple to use as buy-to-let and to pay off existing mortgage debt – Bank required B to use loan to pay off other existing debts, £25,000 to pay off loan for B’s car and £14,500 to pay off credit card – In fact (but unknown to Bank), B used loan to make divorce payment to ex-wife and pay off first charge on property –
Following completion of re-mortgage in October 2013, relationship between couple ended – W-E remained living in property, now heavily mortgaged – Couple fell into arrears, Bank commenced possession proceedings in November 2021 – At contested trial (in which B played no part), W-E alleged acted under B’s undue influence when entering remortgage transaction with Bank – W-E relied on principle established in series of well-known cases to argue was surety (i.e. guarantor) for part of loan made to pay off B’s debts (which totalled £39,500) so Bank “put on inquiry” agreement to transaction may have been obtained by undue influence – Since Bank failed to take steps to be satisfied that W-E’s agreement to stand surety had been obtained in full knowledge of liability she was taking on, W-E said remortgage transaction should be set aside as between her and Bank –
County Court judge said W-E entered remortgage under B’s undue influence – County Court, HC and CA all ruled Bank not put on inquiry W-E agreement to transaction may have been obtained by undue influence because this was joint borrowing, not to be viewed as surety transaction –
SC unanimously allowed appeal – Said creditor put on inquiry in any non-commercial hybrid transaction where, on transaction face, more than de minimis (i.e. trivial) element of borrowing which served to discharge debts of one of borrowers and so might not be to financial advantage of other – Transaction must be viewed from bank’s perspective – Transaction, if viewed in this way, should be regarded as “surety” transaction and creditor placed on inquiry of possibility of undue influence – Steps set out in “Etridge protocol” had to be taken – Appeal allowed.
Opsis Airport Services Inc v Quebec (Attorney-General) [2025] SCC 17 (30 May 2025)
Successful appeal from Quebec CA – Appeals concerned application of provincial statute to enterprises working in fields within exclusive jurisdiction of federal Parliament, airport security and marine security – Doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity served to protect core of exclusive power, either federal or provincial, from being impaired by other level of government – Rooted in notion of exclusivity in text of ss 91 and 92 Constitution Act 1867 – Although constrained by principle and precedent, doctrine played essential role regarding federalism, because possible to balance need for intergovernmental flexibility with need for predictable results – Doctrine application depended on two conditions being met: (1) intrusion on core of exclusive head of power of other level of government, and (2) impairment of core of exclusive head of power –
Opsis Airport Services Inc (Opsis) provided airport security services – Operated emergency call centre at Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, Montréal – Quebec Maritime Services Inc (QMS) worked in international marine transportation sector – Performed loading operations on transatlantic ships out of terminal in La Malbaie – F, QMS employee who monitored and controlled access to port facility –
Opsis, QMS and F received statements of offence charging them with contravening provisions of Private Security Act (PSA), Quebec legislature statute requiring them to hold licence to carry on private security activity – Opsis, QMS and F admitted failure to comply with PSA requirements by not obtaining licence – However, contested statements of offence, saying PSA constitutionally inapplicable to them because of doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity – Said PSA intruded on essential part of their activities falling within federal jurisdiction –
SC unanimously allowed Opsis, QMS, and F’s appeals – Under Condition 1 said Opsis security activities relating to air transportation safety, fell within core federal power over aeronautics under s 91 Constitution Act 1867 – Opsis activities unquestionably within core power because related to security of air transportation itself – PSA application to Opsis activities led to conclusion there was intrusion on core of exclusive head of power – SC also said QMS and F’s activities at marine terminal fell within core of federal navigation and shipping power under s 91(10) – PSA application to QMS and F constituted intrusion on core of exclusive head of power –
Regarding Condition 2, SC said PSA gave Bureau de la sécurité privée, powers enabling it to exercise control over these activities, for example by suspending or cancelling licences, issuing directives or carrying out inspections, all of which impaired core of federal jurisdiction –
PSA’s impairing aspects could not be severed from rest of statute – Statute declared wholly inapplicable to Opsis, QMS and F under doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity – Appeals allowed.
R v Bouvette [2025] SCC 18 (6 June 2025)
Successful appeal from British Columbia CA – Concerned remedy appeal court could grant after setting aside conviction due to miscarriage of justice – Under s 686(2) Criminal Code, when appeal court determined miscarriage of justice occurred, had to overturn conviction – In doing so, appeal court had three options: order new trial, stay proceedings or enter acquittal –
In 2011, B charged with second degree murder of 19-month-old child she was babysitting, who drowned in bath – Autopsy on child’s body performed by doctor who testified for Crown at B’s preliminary inquiry – B pleaded guilty to lesser charge of criminal negligence causing death - Convicted and sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment and probation –
In 2020, special prosecutor, appointed to conduct independent review of case, recommended that appeal court review case to determine if miscarriage of justice had occurred – Crown disclosed materials received before B’s guilty plea which had not been disclosed to B or B’s counsel – Included results of external peer review of Dr’s work indicating conclusions regarding child’s autopsy unreasonable –
British Columbia CA overturned conviction but declined to enter acquittal – Said evidence on record upon which reasonable jury could convict B and no sufficiently exceptional circumstances to justify acquittal – However, CA entered stay of proceedings – B appealed to SC seeking acquittal – Crown agreed B should be acquitted –
SC majority allowed appeal – Said B should be acquitted immediately under s 686(2) Criminal Code on ground Crown sought acquittal and expressly stated would call no evidence at new trial – Rather than forcing parties to go through pro forma proceedings, or standing in way of result by entering judicial stay, SC said just result for acquittal to be entered immediately, even though evidence on record that could lead reasonable jury, properly instructed, to convict B at new trial –
SC said first possible ground for acquittal under s 686(2)(a) where lack of evidence to ground reasonable conviction - Second possible ground where Crown sought acquittal and said would call no evidence at new trial – B acquitted under second ground – Appeal allowed.
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