New Zealand Law Society - Courts roundup 14 May - 20 May 2026
The 2026/2027 Practising Certificate renewals are open. Please renew by 30 June 2026.
Decisions, proceedings and news from the courts in some common law jurisdictions in the past week.
J (SC 180/2025) v R [2026] NZSC 47 (11 May 2026)
Successful interim name suppression application – J applied for leave to appeal CA declining permanent name suppression – After J filed submissions, media report and subsequent public attention (particularly on social media) gave rise to material J wished to put before CA as recall application – Asked leave application to SC be put on hold pending outcome of any recall application to CA –
SC Judge satisfied leave application be adjourned until any CA recall application determined – Order for interim suppression of J’s name, address, occupation and identifying particulars until 3 June 2026.
RH & JY TRUST v Worksafe New Zealand [2026] NZSC 57 (13 May 2026)
Successful leave application – Approved question whether trust and/or trustees of a trust acting collectively is a “person” within meaning of s 16 Health and Safety at Work Act 2015.
Dixon v R [2026] NZSC 58 (15 May 2026)
Unsuccessful leave application – D applied for leave to appeal CA judgment upholding DC imposition of protection order under s 123B Sentencing Act 2002 –
D and victim met in 2017 – Victim said relationship had been very close – Said D best friend – Relationship included sexual intimacy and lasted about a year to a year and a half – Once it ended, D very upset – Threatened suicide and victim ceased contact with him –
D embarked on campaign of offending against victim – Victim obtained protection order which D breached – D pleaded guilty to breaching protection order and attempting to pervert course of justice but contested arson charge – Jury found D guilty on 4 September 2024 – Sentenced on all three charges to four years’ imprisonment and ordered to pay reparations of $3,620.70 –
Judge also imposed protection order subject of D’s leave application – D said Courts below had not “applied themselves” to test in s 14 Family Violence Act 2018 – Said sentencing judge failed to explicitly connect analysis regarding whether there was “close personal relationship” with factors listed in s 14(3) –
SC said although Court had not addressed s 14(3) meaning and might in future give rise to issue having general or public importance, no such issue arose here – No appearance of error in CA assessment – Application dismissed.
[F] v R [2026] NZCA 168
Wang v Vanifatova [2026] NZCA 171
Unsuccessful appeal – Appellants (Ws) acted as agents for Mr Wang Senior in sale of his Auckland townhouse with monolithic cladding to respondent (V) in January 2021 – Property had history of weathertightness issues dating to 2014 including significant remedial works in 2015 – Earlier prospective purchaser had withdrawn after receiving adverse report identifying elevated moisture levels (Dillon Sue Report) – Ws provided V with 2014 Visual Audit report during due diligence period but withheld Dillon Sue report – Description of 2015 works given during due diligence was found to be fundamentally different from the significant remedial works actually undertaken –
HC found elements of tort of deceit proven against Ws and ordered payment of remedial costs ($495,190), consequential losses ($26,580.45) and general damages ($30,000) –
Ws appealed on two grounds – First, that HC conflated Mr Wang Senior's contractual obligation of disclosure as vendor with Ws common law obligation not to be deceitful – Second, that HC failed to consider whether elements of tort were separately proven against each appellant individually -
Ws' tortious liability arose not from contractual breach but from incomplete and partial provision of information in response to specific requests during due diligence – HC was entitled to find Ws acted in concert given their coordinated management of the property over many years - CA dismissed appeal on both grounds.
Rahal v Bhargav [2026] NZCA 176
Partly successful appeal and successful cross-appeal – Respondents (B&K) bought a residential property from Appellant (R) and FTL which was a leaky home – R was director and shareholder of FTL – HC found FTL liable in contract and FTL and R jointly liable for breach of s 9 Fair Trading Act 1986 (FTA) –
CA dismissed R's appeal on personal liability – R approved quotes, authorised all renovation work, made the decision to sell, signed the sale and purchase agreement, and was aware purchasers were presented with false impression of house – R was alter ego of FTL –
CA allowed B&K's cross-appeal on FTA damages – B&K were locked into retaining the leaky property and repairing it, making resale-based damages inappropriate – Costs of remediation and consequential losses were compensable under the FTA – HC awards of $270,000 for breach of the FTA and $51,840 for consequential losses substituted with $688,868.40 (including GST) and $103,107 respectively –
CA allowed R's appeal on general damages – HC award of $80,000 substituted with $35,000 consistent with the conventional range and adjusted for inflation.
Air New Zealand Ltd v McGearty [2026] NZCA 180
Successful application for leave to appeal – Employment Court (EC) found M was unjustifiably disadvantaged and unlawfully discriminated against by Air New Zealand (AirNZ) – AirNZ sought leave to appeal on questions of whether the Court applied the correct principles of contractual interpretation when interpreting the collective agreement, whether the Court applied the proper test for justification when assessing the claim of unjustified disadvantage, and whether the Court correctly found that AirNZ failed to make reasonable adjustments under Human Rights Act 1993 -
Leave on the first question conditional on AirNZ advancing its argument on the basis affirmed in Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd and elaborated in New Zealand Air Line Pilots’ Association Inc v Air New Zealand Ltd - Leave to appeal granted.
Christian Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Australasia) Ltd v Royal Commission of Inquiry into Historical Abuse in State Care and in the Care Of Faith-Based Institutions [2026] NZHC 1295 (15 May 2026) Boldt J
Partly successful judicial review application – Jehovah’s Witnesses faith applied to judicially review part of final report of Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care –
HC rejected faith’s claim case study infringed its right to freedom of religion – HC said state had legitimate interest in examining harmful practices arising in religious institutions – If practices in religious faith likely to cause physical or psychological harm to vulnerable members, no obstacle to state institution, like commission of inquiry, making critical comment –
HC also rejected faith’s claim Commission breached its right to natural justice, and findings lacked proper evidential foundation – HC had only very limited role scrutinising commission of inquiry factual findings – Not for Court to engage in the wholesale reconsideration of factual conclusions –
HC said Commission strayed beyond proper limits of terms of reference – Terms required focus on abuse in care – Discussion of other matters permissible as long as could be said to be genuinely incidental to inquiry into abuse in care – Faith rarely provided care to anyone meaning abuse in care equally rare –
Court said impossible to be critical of Commission’s motivations – Heard harrowing evidence from witnesses whose lives had been damaged – But given case study largely directed at matters outside terms of reference, review ground succeeded –
HC issued declaration case study unlawful as it exceeded inquiry’s terms of reference – Made no other orders, and declaration did not affect validity of any other part of Commission’s final report.
R v Morunga [2026] NZHC 1326 (15 May 2026) Johnstone J
Sentencing – Murder and other offences committed during escape immediately afterwards –
Life imprisonment for murder (not manifestly unjust) - 17-year MPI due to highly callous nature of offending (s 104, Sentencing Act 2002) - Callousness primarily demonstrated by defendant's post-killing conduct - Concurrent 5-year term for arson; concurrent 2-year term for converting two vehicles; concurrent 1-month term and order disqualifying from driving for 12 months for dangerous driving; order disqualifying from driving for 6 months for failing to stop while driving dangerously (cumulative on the 12 months).
CSL Australia Pty Ltd v Tasmanian Ports Corporation Pty Ltd [2026] HCA 15 (13 May 2026)
Unsuccessful appeal from Full FC – Concerned whether CSL Australia Pty Ltd (CSL), entitled to limit liability regarding certain claims in accordance with Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (1976) (as amended) (Convention) as referred to in s 6 Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth) (Act) –
CSL owned and operated bulk cement carrier, which crashed into two tugs and wharf where tugs moored in Devonport, Tasmania, in 2022 – Tugs sank, causing diesel fuel and other hydrocarbons to escape into river – Tasmanian Ports Corporation Pty Ltd (TasPorts), owned and operated tugs and wharf – TasPorts sued CSL for damages, including "costs of and associated with containment, removal and disposal of hydrocarbons, and removal and disposal of the tugs" (para 22(e) claims) –
CSL commenced separate proceeding seeking, among other things, declaration entitled to limit liability, including for para 22(e) claims, in accordance with Convention and s 6 Act – TasPorts contended CSL could not limit liability because claims within scope of Art 2(1)(d) Convention which, as reflected in s 6 Act, Australia had excluded from application, exercising right of reservation under Art 18(1) Convention – CSL said did not matter if para 22(e) claims within Art 2(1)(d) because claims also within Art 2(1)(a) meaning were limitable –
Primary judge in FC said para 22(e) claims, being claims within Art 2(1)(a) limitable irrespective of fact claims also within disapplied Art 2(1)(d) – Full Court allowed TasPorts' appeal, saying para 22(e) claims, being claims within scope of disapplied Art 2(1)(d) not limitable irrespective of fact claims also within Art 2(1)(a) –
HC unanimously dismissed appeal – Said where State exercised power in Art 18(1) Convention and excluded from application Art 2(1)(d), State relevantly excludes from limitation all claims within Art 2(1)(d) irrespective of whether those claims might otherwise be limitable under other sub-paragraphs of Art 2(1) – Appeal dismissed.
Zip Co Limited v Firstmac Limited [2026] HCA 16 (13 May 2026)
Unsuccessful appeal from Full FC – Concerned defence of honest concurrent use arising from ss 122(1)(f) and 122(1)(fa), read with s 44(3), Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) –
In 2004 Firstmac Ltd (Firstmac), registered word mark "ZIP" (Firstmac Mark) for "financial affairs (loans)" – From November 2013, Zip Co Ltd and Zipmoney Pty Ltd (renamed Zipmoney Payments Pty Ltd) (Zip Companies) used, as trade marks, signs containing the word "ZIP" which were substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, Firstmac Mark –
Zip Companies claimed to have defences of honest concurrent use to potential infringements of the Firstmac Mark – FC Trial judge ruled Zip Companies established defences – Full Court ruled they had not –
HC unanimously ruled Zip Companies did not affirmatively establish honesty from time of first potential infringement in November 2013 onwards – The time at which honest concurrent use defences to be assessed was time of each alleged potential infringement – Content of honesty requirement under s 44(3)(a) Trade Marks Act that alleged infringer had state of mind honest by standards of ordinary, decent people – Appeal dismissed.
Patrick Street Holdings Limited v 11368 NL Inc [2026] SCC 15 (8 May 2026)
Unsuccessful appeal from Newfoundland and Labrador CA – 11368 NL Inc. owned property encumbered by numerous mortgages and other claims – In 2016, 11368 defaulted on mortgage Patrick Street Holdings Limited (PSH) held – PSH commenced power of sale proceedings, which were suspended when 11368 agreed to provide PSH with new $4 million collateral mortgage on property – Several weeks later, PSH reactivated power of sale proceedings under defaulted mortgage and purchased property – As mortgagee, PSH prepared accounting regarding sale, in which set out allocations to pay out several mortgages on property that PSH or affiliates held, including $4 million to pay out new collateral mortgage – There were insufficient proceeds to pay out other encumbrancers’ claims that ranked after $4 million mortgage –
In 2016, two encumbrancers commenced applications to challenge PSH’s accounting, and sought orders directing PSH to pay out their claims (2016 applications) – PSH, as mortgagee, and 11368, as mortgagor, listed as respondents – Judge granted applications – Reviewed claims PSH included in and excluded from accounting amount PSH included for several mortgages, excluded $4 million mortgage from accounting, and ordered PSH to pay out two encumbrancers’ claims – CA dismissed PSH’s appeal –
In 2019, 11368 applied for order to be paid property sale proceeds residue (2019 application) – In response, PSH said while $4 million mortgage disallowed from accounting in 2016 applications, remained valid contract between PDSH and 11368 – Further, PSH said 2016 applications did not deal with situation as between PSH and 11368 – Same judge rejected PSH’s argument, relying on decision in 2016 applications, and ordered residue paid to 11368 – CA upheld decision, saying res judicata properly raised by 11368 judge and this doctrine, along with doctrine of abuse of process by relitigation, applied to bar PSH relitigating its claim under the $4 million mortgage – PSH appealed to SC –
SC majority dismissed appeal – Said long-recognised obligation on parties to plead and raise res judicata at first instance – 11368 satisfied obligation, properly pleading doctrine in written submissions and raising before the application judge in 2019 – Cause of action estoppel precluded PSH from challenging judge’s original decision – PSH’s failure in 2016 to advance all reasonably available arguments in defence of its claim to be paid from sale proceeds fatal to ability to raise arguments in 2019 –
SC said res judicata one of several common law doctrines — along with abuse of process by relitigation — existing to prevent abuse of judicial decision-making process – Two branches of res judicata: cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel – Cause of action estoppel barred relitigation of cause of action by either party, whereas issue estoppel precluded litigant from rearguing issue fundamental to decision arrived at in prior proceeding – Appeal dismissed.
Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia [2026] SCC 16 (15 May 2026)
Partly successful appeal from Ontario CA – Concerned whether person could claim damages for tort of intimate partner violence – Court had to decide whether existing torts, such as assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress, enough to address harm caused by coercive and controlling conduct in intimate relationship, and whether new tort should be recognised –
Mr and Ms A married for 16 years – Throughout marriage, Mr A abused Ms A physically and emotionally – Conduct limited her ability to make choices in relationship –
Mr A started divorce proceedings – Ms A agreed to divorce and asked for sole decision-making authority for children, child support, spousal support, equalization of family property, and sale of matrimonial home – Also asked for damages for abuse she suffered – Judge recognised new tort of family violence and awarded Ms A compensatory, aggravated and punitive damages – If she had not recognised new tort, judge said would have awarded same amount under existing torts of assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress -
Mr A appealed – Before CA, Mr A conceded abusive conduct gave rise to liability under existing torts – CA agreed – Said new tort of domestic violence or coercive control should not be recognised – Reduced damages judge awarded to Ms A – She appealed to SC –
SC majority allowed appeal in part – Said new tort of intimate partner violence should be recognised – Said intimate partner violence best understood as coercive and controlling conduct – Not limited to separate acts of physical violence – Might also include conduct such as isolation, humiliation, surveillance, financial control, sexual coercion, and intimidation –
Existing torts not enough to address full harm intimate partner violence caused – For example, assault might address certain acts of physical or threatened harm – Intentional infliction of emotional distress might address serious emotional or psychological harm – However, these torts did not fully address separate harm of coercive control, which limited person’s ability to make choices and could make them unequal in relationship -
Elements of new tort of intimate partner violence were person to show conduct happened during intimate relationship or after it ended, other person intentionally engaged in abusive conduct, and conduct amounted to coercive control when viewed in context –
Here Ms A established these elements – Mr A’s conduct controlled her and undermined her dignity, autonomy, and equality in the relationship – Harm suffered therefore fell within scope of the new tort of intimate partner violence – Entitled to damages under new tort – Appeal partly allowed.