New Zealand Supreme Court

Evidence, trial judge direction on competing narratives

Lidgard v R [2026] NZSC 36 (24 April 2026)

Unsuccessful leave application – Jury found L guilty of 17 charges of historical sexual offending against two complainants in DC – Sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment – Crown’s case at trial largely consisted of complainants’ evidence – Defence case complainants lying –

Before giving recommended direction trial Judge at start of his summing up directed jury on competing Crown and defence narratives – L appealed unsuccessfully to CA – CA said trial Judge’s competing narratives direction unhelpful and not correct for jury to be directed determining case involved choice between evidence of complainants and defendant – However, CA said summing up read as whole clearly and correctly directed jury on the burden and standard of proof –

L applied to SC for leave to appeal, saying trial Judge’s direction gave rise to substantial miscarriage of justice –

SC said key question whether the summing up as a whole misled jury on burden or standard of proof – SC agreed with CA assessment competing narratives direction unhelpful - Taking summing up as a whole, saw no appearance of substantial miscarriage of justice – Application dismissed.

Assets forfeiture, hardship

Alexander v Commissioner of Police [2026] NZSC 38 (24 April 2026)

Unsuccessful leave application – Assets forfeiture orders made in HC under Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 – Related to three items of real estate L owned and $6,000 cash found in one property – L appealed to CA against forfeiture orders and against costs award – CA set aside costs orders but otherwise dismissed appeal – L sought leave to appeal to SC saying forfeiture caused undue hardship –

SC said not disputed property subject to orders was tainted – Only issue on proposed appeal would relate to question of undue hardship – Inter-relationship between approach to hardship in Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act and s 9 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 might give rise to question of general or public importance, but question not fully ventilated in courts below –

SC said proposed appeal not appropriate vehicle for Court to consider broader question about inter-relationship with s 9 – Nor, against background, appearance of miscarriage of justice – Application dismissed.

New Zealand Court of Appeal

Criminal law, procedure, name suppression, hardship – Login required

T v R [2026] NZCA 99

Local Government, mining, roads, licence, public nuisance

Ours Not Mines Ltd v Hauraki District Council [2026] NZCA 138 (CA)

Successful appeal by Ours Not Mines Ltd (ONML) against Hauraki District Council (HDC) and Oceana Gold (New Zealand) Ltd concerning the grant of a 40-year licence over an unformed road in the Wharekirauponga Forest - The licence permitted Oceana Gold to construct and operate ventilation and escape shafts with associated fenced licensed areas for a proposed underground mine beneath the forest - ONML unsuccessfully sought judicial review in HC challenging the Council’s power to grant the licence and alleging, among other grounds, that it unlawfully interfered with the public’s right to pass and repass over the road - ONML appealed HC decision -

Although councils have common law power as landowners to grant licences over roads, roads are held on trust for the public purpose of passage and councils cannot authorise obstructions that appreciably interfere with the public’s right of passage - The licence authorised substantial steel and concrete infrastructure occupying a significant part of the road including fenced areas for 40 years - Despite the road’s remoteness, unformed state and infrequent use, the duration, scale and semi-permanence of the structures affected the functional removal of a significant part of the unformed road from public use for four decades and constituted an appreciable interference with the public right of passage - The licence therefore purported to authorise a public nuisance, which the Council had no power to do, and was unlawful -

Declaration made that the Council’s decision to grant the licence was unlawful and set aside.

Criminal law, sentencing, methamphetamine, importation, minimum period of imprisonment

Feleti v R [2026] NZCA 139

Partly successful appeal by (F) against sentence - F was sentenced to 14 years and nine months' imprisonment with a 40 per cent minimum period of imprisonment (MPI) for multiple charges involving the importation and supply of methamphetamine, conspiracy to supply, and money laundering – F facilitated importations from the United States by utilizing a baggage handling syndicate at Auckland International Airport – Shipments included one 10kg and one 10.229kg of methamphetamine – F arranged 7kg methamphetamine from Tonga in concealed frozen produce – F was also identified in money laundering where he handed over bags of cash totalling over $1M - F appealed arguing 20 year starting point was excessive, 12 month uplift for money laundering offending was too high and MPI was not warranted -

The starting point was within range - F held a leading role as he was in direct communication with international suppliers, organized those on the ground, and expected substantial financial returns – F’s role was materially more serious than those in "significant" roles because he was effectively at the top of the New Zealand operation – Uplift for money laundering was appropriate - Offending was serious and deliberate, aimed at facilitating profit from drug distribution - While the offending was grave, a standard non-parole period was sufficient to achieve the statutory purposes of sentencing - F had demonstrated genuine remorse and extensive rehabilitative efforts while on electronically monitored bail, including volunteer youth work and completing vocational certifications - These factors indicated a resolve to reform that made a court-imposed MPI unnecessary for personal deterrence or community protection – Appeal allowed in part – MPI set aside – Appeal against sentence was otherwise dismissed.

Human rights, victimisation, discrimination, Human Rights Review Tribunal, Accident Compensation, jurisdiction 

Dunn v Accident Compensation Corporation [2026] NZCA 140 

Supreme Court of Canada

Forfeiture, stay of criminal proceedings

R v Nguyen [2026] SCC 10 (17 April 2026)

Partly successful appeal from Quebec CA – Concerned what happened to property police seized when criminal charges stayed –

Here, several people charged with offences related to cannabis production – During investigation, police seized property – One later pleaded guilty and sentenced – Proceedings against others stayed because of unreasonable delay, violating right to be tried within reasonable time guaranteed by s 11(b) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms –

After charges stayed, Crown applied to Court of Quebec to keep seized property – Others said Court of Quebec no longer had power to make forfeiture order and property should be returned to them because criminal proceedings stayed – Court of Quebec rejected argument and allowed application to go ahead – Others applied to Superior Court to stop forfeiture application from continuing before Court of Quebec – Superior Court dismissed application – Others appealed to CA who allowed appeal, saying Court of Quebec could no longer make order because criminal cases had ended – However, CA declined to return the property – Crown appealed to SC –

SC unanimously allowed appeal in part – Said stay ended prosecution, but did not prevent court from deciding what happened to property linked to alleged crime – Were separate questions – Some forfeiture rules only applied if person found guilty or sentenced – Because stay stops case before any finding of guilt, Crown could not use those rules here – However, other rules focused on property itself and allowed courts to decide what should happen to property even when someone not found guilty – Crown could have relied on those rules – Case sent back to Court of Quebec to decide whether property should be returned or forfeited – Appeal allowed in part.

Murder, fresh evidence

R v Maadani [2026] SCC 11 (17 April 2026)

Unsuccessful appeal from Ontario CA – M involved in shooting leading to another man’s death – M fired five shots at other man, who also fired one shot hitting accused’s leg – Scene captured on security video – At trial, M said acted in self-defence – Jury did not accept and found M guilty of second-degree murder –

Four years after shooting, M tried to introduce fresh evidence from witness who would have testified to deceased being aggressor in altercation, as well as evidence from defence lawyer’s staff on why evidence not presented at trial – Fresh evidence related to several questions surrounding M’s self-defence claim, including who started confrontation, who pulled gun first, and who shot first – Witness said deceased acted aggressively before shooting and fired first shot – M argued evidence supported his self-defence claim and could have changed jury’s decision - M also said judge failed to properly instruct jury on his role in fight –

CA majority said judge’s instructions provided jury with all required to reach verdict – Also refused to admit fresh evidence as witness not sufficiently reliable and no good reason why evidence had not been presented at trial – Also said evidence would not have changed outcome - Dismissed appeal and maintained conviction – M appealed to SC –

SC majority dismissed appeal – Upheld conviction and dismissed motion to admit fresh evidence.

Sexual assault, time of

R v GG [2026] SCC 12 (24 April 2026)

Unsuccessful appeal from Ontario CA – GG charged with sexually assaulting wife - Both GG and complainant agreed sexual intercourse occurred – Disagreed about time of sexual intercourse, and whether consensual –

Complainant testified GG had sexual intercourse with her without her consent – During cross-examination, said incident occurred between about 10:00 pm and 11:00 pm – GG acknowledged sexual intercourse occurred that day but said consensual and happened about 21 hours earlier, at around 1:00 am – Said left family home at around 9:00 pm and later stayed at girlfriend’s home – In other words, would have left family home before time when complainant said sexual assault occurred –

Judge accepted complainant’s evidence and found that GG sexually assaulted her – However, because complainant said assault occurred between 10:00 pm and 11:00 pm, when GG would have been at girlfriend’s house, judge concluded Crown had not proven beyond reasonable doubt assault occurred within that one-hour period – Judge acquitted GG –

CA allowed Crown’s appeal – Said judge erred to require Crown to prove sexual assault occurred within precise one-hour period – Set aside acquittal, entered conviction for sexual assault, and returned matter to trial court for sentencing – GG appealed to SC – SC dismissed appeal.

United Kingdom Supreme Court

Adoption, setting aside order, jurisdiction

In the matter of X and Y (Children: Adoption Order: Setting Aside) [2026] UKSC 13 (22 April 2026)

Unsuccessful appeal from CA – Concerned whether courts had any jurisdiction to set aside validly made order for child adoption other than by way appeal – Unique attribute of adoption order, in contrast to any other order for welfare of child, was final and permanent – Legal relationship of parenthood between parents and natural child could only be extinguished by valid adoption order, and question whether same true of legal relationship adoption established –

AM, X and Y’s adoptive mother – X and Y and natural mother, BM, supported AM’s contention had to be alternative non-statutory route to revoke valid adoption order where no scope for appeal to allow consideration of child’s specific circumstances and welfare – Alternative route relied on was HC inherent jurisdiction (parens patriae jurisdiction) –

X and Y no longer children, having both turned 18 – When aged four and five years old, placed for adoption with AM in 2012 following prolonged period in foster care – Adoption order in AM’s favour in May 2013 – X and Y maintained contact with BM, which AM facilitated and supported – In 2021, X and Y left AM’s house and moved to live with BM – Y remained with BM – X moved to live with birth father in 2022 – Adoption breakdown followed AM rejecting X or Y – AM motivated to support X and Y and give effect to their wishes and feelings –

In February 2023, local authority issued care proceedings reasoning X and Y beyond parental control – Care proceedings concluded in May 2023 with child arrangement orders X live with birth father and Y with BM – Also ordered X should spend time with BM – Orders conferred parental responsibility on respective birth parent –

In April 2023, AM applied to HC seeking to revoke adoption order under HC’s inherent jurisdiction – Application on welfare grounds to give effect to X and Y’s wishes and feelings – Both supported the application, alongside BM – Judge accepted there to be power to revoke validly made adoption order under inherent jurisdiction, but said that it could not be used solely on grounds relating to adopted child’s welfare - Accordingly, said had no power to revoke the adoption orders here –

AM appealed to CA, which dismissed appeal – Ruled first instance court had no jurisdiction to set aside validly made adoption order, whether under inherent jurisdiction or otherwise – Adoption and Children Act 2002 (ACA 2002) clear that adoption order intended to be permanent – Appropriate avenue to apply for permission to appeal out of time, if appealable error – That adoption “turned out badly” not reason for court to supply remedy Parliament chose not to provide –

AM, supported by BM, Y and in some respects X, appealed to SC – Said pressing need for court to correct legal fiction said to exist where BM once again de facto mother of Y, and possibly X, but AM remains their mother for all legal purposes and Y is trapped in identity she had rejected –

SC unanimously dismissed appeal – Said since X and Y no longer children, parens patriae jurisdiction, if it might provide basis for setting aside valid adoption order, could not be applied here – Court nevertheless said important to hear and determine appeal, as good reason in public interest for doing so – Likely there would be other cases like this resolving question raised did not depend on the facts here –

SC said first question whether jurisdiction existed to set aside validly made adoption order – This preceded whether any jurisdiction capable of being exercised in cases of pressing need –

SC said necessary to go back to first principles and consider jurisdiction nature and the context in which sought to be invoked – Parens patriae jurisdiction ancient prerogative jurisdiction belonging to Crown – To extent that it survived, was residual jurisdiction – Proper approach to deciding whether remained available was to consider how used historically and how had continued to be used in modern times – Importantly, prerogative power displaced in a field where corresponding power conferred or regulated by statute – Where matter regulated by statute, using inherent jurisdiction limited not only to when statute expressly said so, but by implication – Inherent jurisdiction could not be used to circumvent legislation, either by achieving same aim by different procedural route, or by achieving aims incompatible with statutory scheme –

Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction to make orders in respect of children who have suffered or who are at risk of suffering significant harm heavily curtailed after passing of Children Act 1989 – Fundamental problems with arguing inherent jurisdiction available to protect interests of child in the present context –

Notional use of the inherent jurisdiction to revoke valid adoption order as safety net to protect children in exceptional circumstances would also cut across statutory scheme in ACA 2002 – Was because adoption orders final and permanent, and irrevocable except on one very limited ground, namely rarely used legitimation exception –

No remaining scope to exercise inherent power to revoke adoption order and wrong to approach jurisdiction question by saying if child’s welfare makes it necessary, the jurisdiction must exist – Appeal dismissed.

Insurance policies, COVID-19, “Government” action

Gatwick Investment Ltd v Liberty Mutual Insurance Europe SE; Bath Racecourse Company Ltd v Liberty Mutual Insurance Europe SE [2026] UKSC 14 (22 April 2026)

Unsuccessful appeals from CA – Concerned claims under business interruption insurance policies for losses policyholders suffered during the Covid-19 pandemic – In first proceedings (Gatwick Proceedings), policyholders owned or operated hotels in England – In second (Arena Proceedings), policyholders operated racecourses, greyhound racing tracks, golf clubs, hotels and pub in England and Wales – In each case policyholders insured against risks including “Government” action which prevented or hindered using premises following “danger or disturbance” (agreed to include any occurrence of Covid-19) within 1 mile of premises –

In test case SC decided several issues about effect of different types of business interruption insurance policy (including policies like these) and how they applied to financial losses related to Covid-19 – Based on that decision, insurers accept in principle liable to indemnify policyholders for such losses – Issue in these appeals whether “savings” clauses in policies require credit to be given in calculating amounts payable by insurers for furlough payments policyholders received from UK Government under Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme – Savings clauses based on standard wording published by the Association of British Insurers –

HC and CA both decided furlough payments policyholders “reduced” charges or expenses of business and did so “in consequence” of “incident” / “Damage” – Agreed term “incident” or “Damage” refers to occurrence of risk covered by policy (known as “insured peril”) – Accordingly, courts said furlough payments had to be deducted from amounts payable under policies – Policyholders appealed to SC arguing: (i) there was no “reduction” of charges or expenses as wages and other employment costs had to be paid by policyholder before being reimbursed under furlough payment scheme (construction issue); and (ii) as a matter of law furlough payments not caused by insured peril and therefore not “in consequence” of it (causation issue) –

SC unanimously dismissed appeal – Said no unique approach to interpreting insurance policies – As set out in test case policy terms had to be interpreted objectively, asking what reasonable person in position of parties would have understood policy language to mean Court further confirmed both permissible and correct to consider indemnity nature of insurance policy when interpreting its terms, provided policy language did not require otherwise –

Savings clauses could be understood as referring to whether charge or expense is reduced as matter of fact (as insurers argued) or whether liability for charge or expense reduced as matter of law (as policyholders argued) – Either construction possible meaning, but Court said insurers’ construction to be preferred – Appeal dismissed.