Criminal, conviction appeal, miscarriage of justice, trial counsel error - Login required   

[J] v R [2026] NZCA 319 (17 July 2026)  

Criminal, leave to appeal, disclosure of data extracted by the police from third party cell phone - Login required 

[L] v R [2026] NZCA 318 (16 July 2026) 

Employment, leave to appeal, question of general and public importance, Union’s compliance with constitution, Employment Court’s power of review

Corrections Association of New Zealand v Jenner [2026] NZCA 317 (16 July 2026) 

Successful application for appeal – J (Vice President of Union) was subject to a removal process initiated under Union Committee under its constitution – J sought judicial review under s 194 Employment Relations Act 2002 – Interim injunction granted pending determination – Committee passed resolution restricting J's functions, which J said breached the injunction – Employment Court's substantive decision found Committee had not complied with constitution – Union sought leave to appeal on two questions: (1) whether the EC wrongly used s 194 to restrict Committee's consideration of removal; (2) whether resolution breached Court order –   

Question 2 an invitation to review merits, not a question of law – Question 1 seriously arguable and of general and public importance, given s 161 ERA (jurisdiction) conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Authority over union constitutional compliance, raising a genuine jurisdictional overlap issue affecting all unions – Not rendered moot by J's subsequent removal, as the jurisdictional question had ongoing implications beyond this dispute – Leave to appeal granted on the reframed question of whether the EC's s 194 review powers extended to union constitutional non-compliance.  

New Zealand High Court

Sentencing, murder of police officer, minimum period of imprisonment    

R v Tasker [2026] NZHC 2140 (24 July 2026)  

Sentencing for murder of police officer – Intentionally causing grievous bodily harm to another police officer – Dangerous driving causing injury to police officer and member of public – T deliberately drove vehicle at two officers because they were police, using it as a deadly weapon, before deliberately ramming a police vehicle and injuring two others – Driving while disqualified and with excess blood alcohol – Previous offending involving use of vehicle as a weapon –  

Life imprisonment mandatory – Statutory minimum MPI under s 104 Sentencing Act 2002 17 years – Adopted MPI starting point for murder 20 years, with 3-year uplift for additional offending, and 1-year reduction recognising connection between offending and defendant's emotional instability and dysfunction – Limited mitigation – Qualified remorse and guilty pleas of little significance –  

Sentenced to life imprisonment with MPI of 22 years for murder, 8 years' imprisonment for intentionally causing grievous bodily harm, 2 years' imprisonment and disqualified from driving for 2 years for each of two dangerous driving causing injury charges – All sentences and periods of disqualification concurrent.  

United Kingdom Supreme Court

Homelessness, main housing duty, whether authority’s duty ceases automatically on acceptance or refusal of housing, right to request judicial review  

R (on the application of Bano) (Appellant) v London Borough of Waltham Forest (Respondent) [2026] UKSC (22 July 2026)  

SC considered whether, under s 193(7AA) Housing Act 1996, a local housing authority’s main housing duty to a homeless applicant automatically ceases when the applicant accepts or refuses a compliant private rented sector offer, or only after the authority makes and notifies a further decision that the duty has ended – Appellant, B, had been owed the main housing duty by the London Borough of Waltham Forest – Authority later offered her private rented accommodation in Derby, stating that acceptance or refusal of the offer would discharge its duty – B refused offer and did not request a statutory review within 21 days – She later sought judicial review, arguing that the duty had not ended because the authority had not made and notified a separate decision following her refusal –  

Appeal was dismissed – On proper construction of s 193(7AA), where a compliant private rented sector offer is accepted or refused, the main housing duty automatically ceases as a matter of law – Authority is not required to make or notify a further decision after acceptance or refusal – Offer letter itself is the reviewable decision under s 202, because it records the authority’s decision that the duty will end if the offer is accepted or refused –  

Court rejected the argument that the statutory review scheme required a later discharge decision – Wording of s 193(7AA), contrasted with s 193(5), showed that Parliament had not imposed any requirement for a further notification – Applicant’s right of review was preserved because the offer letter was capable of review under s 202(1)(b) and (g), including as to whether the statutory requirements for ending the duty had been met and whether the accommodation was suitable –  

Court further held that there was no scope for confirmatory decisions (notifications of a prior automatic discharge) to be amenable to review – To treat merely confirmatory letters as new reviewable decisions would undermine the statutory time limit and finality of the review process – Because B had an adequate alternative remedy by way of a statutory review, judicial review was not available.

Contract interpretation, sale of ships, damages, loss of bargain

Great Asia Maritime Ltd v Orion Shipping & Trading LLC [2026] UKSC 23 (22 July 2026)  

Unsuccessful appeal against CA decision – CA found Great Asia Maritime (GAM) entitled to loss of bargain damages under clause 14 of Norwegian Saleform (NSF) standard form contract for sale of a vessel – Orion Shipping and Trading (OS) appealed on basis loss of bargain damages only recoverable for repudiatory breach of contract –   

OS failed to give notice of readiness by original Cancelling Date and revised Cancelling Date due to proven negligence – GAM cancelled agreement – Arbitrators found GAM entitled to loss of bargain damages under clause 14, including US$1.85 million to reflect difference between contract price and market price at cancellation – Commercial Court found clause 14 did not permit recovery of loss of bargain damages without repudiatory breach – CA reversed, restoring arbitral award –  

SC found the word "loss" in clause 14 general and unqualified, and included loss of bargain suffered by GAM as a result of cancellation – Conclusion supported by parallel wording in clause 13 (“Buyers' default”), by analogy with ordinary measure of damages for non-delivery under s 51(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, and by established meaning given to clause 14 in prior authorities – Established meaning not displaced by subsequent amendments to NSF standard form –   

OS argued Financings Ltd v Baldock established causation principle that loss of bargain damages not recoverable for termination under express termination clause, rather than repudiatory breach – SC found principle does not apply once parties agree an express compensation clause (clause 14B) – SC also rejected submission that clear words required to confer right to loss of bargain damages – GAM had suffered actual loss and no question arose of clause operating arbitrarily – Appeal dismissed.  

United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

Employment law, religion or belief discrimination, race discrimination

Summary London Ambulance Service NHS Trust v Garrett [2026] EAT 77 (29 May 2026)  

Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) overturned an Employment Tribunal (ET) finding that an employee’s rejection of the concept of systemic racism amounted to a manifestation of a protected belief –  

G faced disciplinary action following two complaints about comments he had made to colleagues in which he rejected the concept of systemic racism and allegedly made further remarks about race – G denied the specific statements but admitted rejecting the concept of systemic racism - Following a disciplinary hearing, G was issued with a final written warning and required to complete unconscious bias training, a black allyship workshop, and a written reflective exercise – Subsequently, G brought direct race and belief discrimination claims against respondent employer –  

ET had found G held a protected philosophical belief that “all people should be treated with respect” and G’s rejection of systemic racism was a manifestation of that protected belief – It concluded that employer’s treatment of G during the disciplinary process amounted to direct belief discrimination – Specifically, the reason for the treatment was his rejection of systemic racism, which was a manifestation of his protected belief –  

EAT allowed the employer’s appeal and substituted its decision which ultimately dismissed all of G’s claim – ET had made an error of law by incorrectly treating G’s rejection of systemic racism as a manifestation of his protected belief, as well as failing to properly analyse the reasons for employer’s actions – In religion or belief discrimination cases, a line must be drawn between the belief itself and the manifestation of the belief, and there needs to be an intimate link between the belief and its manifestation, flowing logically from one to the other, for a claim of direct discrimination to succeed –    

EAT held that ET had erred in treating G’s rejection of systemic racism as a manifestation of his protected belief that all people should be treated equally and with respect – The protected belief was normative, concerning how people ought to be treated, whereas the rejection of systemic racism was descriptive, concerning whether a social phenomenon existed; the latter did not flow logically from, nor was it intimately linked to, the former – EAT found that there was no “undeniable link” reasoning that a person who holds the same belief of there being no systematic racism could equally be of the opinion that racism does exist – EAT concluded G’s no-systematic belief was not a manifestation of the normative treatment belief.  

Supreme Court of Canada

Property, riparian rights, submerged lands, accessories to sale, interpretation of deeds, civil law  

Zardev Inc v Dydzak [2026] SCC 27 (24 July 2026)  

Purchasers of riparian lots on Lac Masson sought ownership of a submerged strip of land created when a public dam constructed in 1881 raised the lake level – Although the deeds described the lots as “bounded by Lake” and did not mention the submerged lands, the majority held that the submerged lots were accessories to the riparian lots under Quebec’s law of sale -

The owners relied on the civil law maxim accessorium sequitur principale (the accessory follows the principal), which is partially codified in the general law of sale in Quebec and requires the seller to deliver to buyer, along with the principal property sold, “all its accessories” – Since the accessory rule is a rule of suppletive law in the general law of sale, it can apply when the parties make no mention of the accessory – 

Analysing the meaning of the word “accessory”, Judge K found that it refers to property that is destined to serve the principal property and is necessary for its use – Applying this interpretation to the facts, he concluded that the submerged lands were necessary for the use that the parties intended the riparian lots to have (which was providing direct and exclusive access to the lakeshore), and submerged lands were transferred with the riparian lots at the time of the sales – Judge C, dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, holding that the submerged lots were not accessories and, in any event, were excluded by the deeds’ precise descriptions of the lots sold.