New Zealand Law Society - Courts roundup 3 September - 9 September 2026
Decisions, proceedings and news from the courts in some common law jurisdictions in the past week.
Rimmer v Wilton [2026] NZSC 122 (4 September 2026)
Successful appeal by adult children of deceased R against CA decision upholding entitlement of respondent W, R's surviving de facto partner, to receive share of estate under both s 21 Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA) contracting out agreement and intestacy provisions of Administration Act 1969 – R died intestate in March 2016 – R and W had entered s 21 agreement in 2002 governing status, ownership and division of relationship property, including Moumoukai Road property owned as tenants in common in equal shares – Agreement provided W with lifetime occupancy of relationship property on R's death and full and final settlement of all claims under any statute – W elected option B under s 61 PRA and received entitlements under both agreement and s 77 Administration Act – HC and CA held W entitled to both –New Zealand Law Society intervened –
CA erred in interpretation of agreement – Correct interpretation of s 21 agreement determined by meaning conveyed to reasonable person with background knowledge available to parties at time of contracting – Agreement, read as a whole, comprehensively defined parties' entitlements to relationship property on death and intestacy – Clause 5.1 full and final settlement clause constituted contractual promise not to claim any interest under any statute including Administration Act – Parties may contract out of default intestacy entitlements under Administration Act by s 21 PRA agreement, consistent with s 81(6) Administration Act and s 21D(1)(c) and s 95(2) PRA – Option elected under s 61 PRA of diminished significance where agreement comprehensively regulates entitlements on death – W's entitlement to Moumoukai Road property limited to her own share and life interest under cl 4.4, no further entitlement to R's share under Administration Act –
Appeal allowed.
Peka v Te Hei [2026] NZSC 121 (4 September 2026)
Unsuccessful appeal by P, personal representative of estate of H, against CA decision upholding HC's quashing of Victims' Special Claims Tribunal award of $15,000 to H for emotional harm – H was a victim of respondent TH's rape and murder of her daughter in 1987 – TH convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment – Crown paid TH compensation for mistreatment in prison under New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 – H claimed against TH under Prisoners' and Victims' Claims Act 2005 (PVC Act) for emotional harm and exemplary damages – Tribunal upheld emotional harm claim - HC allowed TH's appeal finding no identifiable cause of action under general law – CA referred claim back to Tribunal on basis of possible common law claim for psychiatric harm – H died prior to CA judgment – Cross-appeal by TH allowed –
Claim under PVC Act must disclose cause of action available under general law – Court declined to remove requirements for secondary victim tort claims established in van Soest v Residual Health Management Unit, namely that claimant suffer recognisable psychiatric illness or disorder – Insufficient evidence and information to assess implications of changing law for broader category of cases – Any such reconsideration appropriate only in suitable case reflecting current societal needs – Novel tort based on wrongful death likewise declined – Court declined to overrule Re Chase, Law Reform Act 1936 barring estate from recovering exemplary damages correctly decided – Merger principle did not apply as remission to Tribunal would require new inquiry analogous to retrial – Court declined to overrule McCarthy v Palmer and Pou v British American Tobacco (New Zealand) Ltd, damages under Deaths by Accidents Compensation Act 1952 confined to pecuniary losses, any change a matter for Parliament –
Appeal dismissed, cross-appeal allowed.
Larsen v Fire and Emergency New Zealand [2026] NZCA 421 (2 September 2026)
Unsuccessful application by L for leave to appeal under s 214 Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA) against an EC decision upholding an Authority determination that Fire and Emergency New Zealand’s (FENZ) placement of L on unpaid leave was not unjustifiable – L, a firefighter, held a record of settlement (ROS) promising him a Whangārei posting but this was found unenforceable as inconsistent with the merit-appointment and vacancy-notification requirements of ss 26-27 Fire and Emergency New Zealand Act 2017 – L declined multiple alternative proposals from FENZ over two years before being placed on unpaid leave for refusing to report to his original station – CA held the EC's "not unjustifiable" finding under s 103A(2) ERA was an evaluative, fact-specific assessment rather than a question of law – CA found the second, third and fourth proposed questions mischaracterised the judgment's actual reasoning on good faith – CA held the first proposed question (enforceability of the ROS) was arguable but not determinative of the outcome since the focus had to be on the circumstances as they appeared in 2021; rejected the sufficiency-of-reasons ground; and found no issue of general or public importance was raised –
Application for leave to appeal declined.
Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Manawa v CNI Iwi Holdings Ltd [2026] NZCA 419 (2 September 2026)
Unsuccessful application by Ngāti Manawa for a temporary holding order under r 12(3)(b) Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005, pending determination of a related application for a notice order – Ngāti Manawa had appealed the HC's dismissal of its claim that CNI Iwi Holdings Ltd lacked power to enter a proposed forestry rights transaction with Kaingaroa Timberlands Partnership (KT) without unanimous beneficiary consent, and sought orders requiring 15 working days' notice before any such transaction – CA applied the established interim relief factors (including whether the appeal would be rendered nugatory, bona fides, effect on third parties, and balance of convenience) – CA accepted Ngāti Manawa's bona fides but found no basis to think the circumstances as they appeared from the HC material had changed significantly – Known facts did not support the level of concern raised by Ngāti Manawa – A holding order could adversely affect the ongoing commercial negotiations with KT –
Application for a temporary holding order declined.
Double v Police [2026] NZCA 418 (2 September 2026)
Successful application by D for leave to bring a second appeal under s 303 Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (CPA) – D was convicted of driving with excess breath alcohol and made subject to an alcohol interlock order, but failed to install the device and was later caught driving without one – At sentencing for driving while disqualified, D applied under s 100B Land Transport Act 1998 (LTA) to cancel the interlock order on the basis his personal circumstances had changed significantly – DC declined applying the approach in Verryt v Police – HC dismissed his appeal on the basis no appeal pathway existed –
CA considered s 253 (sentence appeal) and s 223 CPA were inappropriate vehicles given the circularity of determining whether a s 100B LTA refusal is a "sentence" or attracts a bespoke LTA appeal pathway – CA instead treated the application as one for leave to bring a second appeal on a question of law under s 303 CPA – CA found the existence of an appeal pathway from a s 100B LTA refusal, and the correct approach to assessing "changed circumstances" under s 100B LTA were matters of general or public importance as this was the first case to squarely raise the jurisdictional question –
Application for leave to appeal granted; questions of law approved.
R v Hannon-McGinn [2026] NZHC 2670 (1 September 2026)
Sentence – HM and H sentenced for murder of B, HM as principal and H as a party by encouragement and assistance – HM additionally pleaded guilty to arson, while the jury found H guilty of same –
HM and H travelled armed to B's property at the request of HM's father, following an earlier altercation between B and the father – HM called for B to come outside, shot him at close range, then dragged his body inside and set the house on fire to destroy evidence –
HC found life imprisonment was not manifestly unjust for either offender under s 102 Sentencing Act 2002 – Two aggravating factors under s 104 engaged, namely s 104(e); high level of callousness, given ambush-like circumstances and arson of both B’s body and house, and s 104(g) victim vulnerability; B being alone, unarmed and physically overmatched –
HC held a 17 year MPI would be manifestly unjust for each offender, having regard to totality of offending and personal circumstances, each offender's age, remorse and rehabilitative prospects – Notional starting point MPIs of 14 years for HM, as instigator and shooter, and 12 years for H, reflecting his lesser role as a party – HM allowed one year reduction for remorse and difficult upbringing with a causal connection to the offending – H allowed reductions for remorse, time spent on restrictive EM bail, and psychological processing difficulties found to have reduced his capacity to appraise and disengage from the situation –
HM sentenced to life imprisonment with an MPI of 13 years - H sentenced to life imprisonment with an MPI of 10 years and 4 months – Each also sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment for arson to be served concurrently – Firearms prohibition orders made against each under s 39A(1)(a) Arms Act 1983.
R v Lemon [2026] NZHC 2667 (3 September 2026)
Sentencing for manslaughter committed by arson – L deliberately set fire to a vehicle or carport at victim’s home after becoming frustrated at not finding any drugs and left without raising the alarm – Fire spread to house and caused the death of R – Initially charged with murder, L later admitted lighting the fire and pleaded guilty to manslaughter following an admissibility hearing –
Aggravating features were intrusion onto private property, failure to warn occupants, offending while subject to supervision, and acting from anger or frustration – Offending was not premeditated – L’s extremely low cognitive functioning and limited ability to foresee consequences materially reduced culpability –
Starting point 6 years' imprisonment, 15 per cent discount for guilty plea, which avoided trial but was entered late and after the admissibility ruling – No separate discount for remorse - Ten per cent discount for severe childhood deprivation and abuse, substance misuse, adolescent brain injury, and impaired cognitive functioning; the seriousness of the offending limited the reduction – Six month uplift for lengthy criminal history, including multiple convictions for violence – End sentence 5 years' imprisonment for manslaughter.
Dickson v Registrar of the Real Estate Agents Authority [2026] NZREADT 42 (1 September 2026)
Unsuccessful application for review of decision of Tribunal to decline an exemption from compulsory course covering te reo Māori, tikanga and Te Tiriti o Waitangi –
D, licensed real estate agent, applied for exemption under r 13 Real Estate Agents (Continuing Professional Development Rules) Notice 2018 (CPD Rules) from completing Te Kākano, a mandatory 2023 continuing professional development course addressing te reo and tikanga Māori, Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and Māori land, on basis requirement to attend breached her right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion – Registrar declined the application because D had not shown exceptional circumstances preventing completion of the course –
D sought judicial review from the HC, challenging the validity of the CPD Rules and the compulsory nature of Te Kākano – HC dismissed her application –
D argued that compulsory attendance offended her ethical and religious convictions, infringed her freedom of thought, conscience and religion under s 13 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), and that the Registrar had unlawfully narrowed “exceptional circumstances” by requiring that the circumstances prevent completion – Under r 13, exceptional circumstances must be circumstances that prevent completion of the required CPD – That interpretation followed the Tribunal’s authorities, had been endorsed by the HC, and Registrar’s reliance on that requirement was lawful –
D’s political objections to the course were not exceptional and did not prevent completion – Her sincerely held perception that the course conflicted with her moral and religious beliefs could amount to exceptional circumstances, but those beliefs did not prevent her from attending – Te Kākano required her to receive information about another culture in a professional context; it did not require her to renounce, adopt, or act upon any belief – Her choice not to complete the course was therefore a matter of principle rather than inability –
Was no infringement of ss 13 or 14 NZBORA - Registrar had substantively considered D’s ethical and religious objections, even though the decision did not expressly cite s 13 – Applying the review principles in Kacem v Bashir, Registrar’s decision disclosed no error of law or principle, no failure to consider a mandatory relevant matter, and was not plainly wrong – Any cancellation of D’s licence for non-compliance would be a statutory consequence of failing to complete CPD –
Application for review dismissed; Registrar’s decision confirmed.
State of West Virginia v James 1:25-cv-00168, (N.D.N.Y.) (31 August 2026)
US District Court Northern District of New York granted summary judgment to two groups of plaintiffs challenging New York’s Climate Change Superfund Act (Act), holding that is pre-empted and could not be enforced by federal law –
In 2024, New York enacted the Act, which established a climate change adaptation cost recovery program of US $75B and required “responsible parties” to pay their “proportional liability” for that amount – Purpose of the Act was to secure compensatory payments from responsible parties based on a standard of strict liability to provide a source of revenue for climate change adaptive infrastructure projects within New York –
Court held Alpha Metallurgical Resources and members of the plaintiff trade associations faced a credible threat of enforcement and therefore had standing to challenge the Act – Act imposed strict liability on fossil fuel producers responsible for more than one billion tons of covered greenhouse gas emissions during 2000-2024 including emissions attributable to worldwide extraction and refining, and legislative materials identified several plaintiffs or association members as likely targets – This was sufficient for individual and associational standing in a pre-enforcement challenge –
Applying City of New York v Chevron Corp, the Court held that the Act’s statutory cost recovery scheme was not materially distinguishable from state common law claims seeking damages for global greenhouse gas emissions – Act sought compensatory payments, on a strict liability basis, for emissions attributable to worldwide fossil fuel extraction and refining – Such liability would effectively regulate conduct beyond New York and conflicted with the federal need for uniform rules governing interstate pollution, national energy policy and federalism –
Federal common law governing interstate air pollution had been displaced by the Clean Air Act – Resort to state law was therefore permissible only to the extent authorised by that statute - Clean Air Act did not authorise New York’s worldwide emissions compensation regime – Environmental Protection Agency’s 2026 rescission of its greenhouse gas endangerment finding did not alter the statutory allocation of authority or the pre-emption analysis –
The Act also could not constitutionally impose cost recovery liability on foreign producers based on foreign emissions because doing so would intrude on the federal government’s authority over foreign affairs –
Court considered legislative materials, public energy reports and corporate filings for the non-hearsay purpose of assessing whether enforcement was credibly threatened – It did not rely on the disputed expert declarations and therefore denied all motions to strike as moot –
Court granted the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment on pre-emption, denied New York’s cross-motion, did not reach the remaining constitutional claims, and directed a status report on further proceedings –
Ruling indicates a state cannot avoid the pre-emption principles in City of New York by recasting climate damages claims as a statutory cost recovery programme – Its broader effect may depend on the US Supreme Court’s pending decision in Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County concerning whether federal law precludes state law claims for harms attributed to interstate and international greenhouse gas emissions.