Administrative law, judicial review, statutory powers, Māori Wardens

New Zealand Māori Council v Minister for Māori Development [2026] NZHC 3244 (22 October 2026)  

NZ Māori Council (NZMC) sought judicial review of a funding agreement under which Te Puni Kōkiri agreed to provide Ngā Wātene Māori o Aotearoa Charitable Trust (the Trust) with $2.7M annually over four years to build the capability and capacity of Māori Wardens – The agreement required the Trust to distribute funding among regional entities, coordinate Māori Warden activities, support service delivery and events, provide training and resources, employ additional staff, and report to Te Puni Kōkiri – NZMC and District Māori Councils (DMCs) were not involved in administering the agreement – NZMC claimed the legislation did not permit the Crown to enter into a funding agreement with a body outside of the Maori Community Development Act 1962 (MDCA), such as the Trust, and doing so would have the effect of usurping the NZMC’s and its subordinate DMCs’ exclusive power and authority to control and supervise the activities of Māori Wardens carrying out duties under the legislation –  

Court found in favour of NZMC, determining that proper interpretation of the legislation is that DMCs, and by extension NZMC, have exclusive power and authority to control and supervise Māori Wardens general community support and welfare promotion activities – This power was not confined to controlling and supervising the exercise of powers conferred to Māori Wardens under MDCA ss 31-35 to manage disorder and alcohol consumption – Māori Wardens could organise and receive funding through a representative body for purposes unrelated to controlling or supervising their statutory activities – Such arrangements could not, however, usurp or encroach on the authority vested exclusively in the NZMC and DMCs – Funding agreement went beyond providing general support to a representative organisation – It required the Trust to govern, manage and coordinate Māori Wardens’ work, establish decision-making and administrative systems, support events, provide training and uniforms, employ coordinating staff, and meet reporting and performance conditions – Those obligations concerned activities falling within the statutory sphere of NZMC and DMC control – The Trust thereby exercised control over the statutory activities of its Māori Warden members without NZMC or DMC involvement – Te Puni Kōkiri also exercised a degree of control by funding those activities and imposing conditions on their performance – The arrangement consequently encroached on the statutory authority of the NZMC and DMCs – It was unnecessary to decide conclusively whether ss 7(6) and 25 occupied the entire field of Māori Warden funding – Any prerogative or residual power of the Crown to contract or fund organisations remained subject to the Act and could not authorise conduct contrary to it – The funding provisions reinforced the connection between funding and statutory control – Alleged dysfunction or inactivity within the NZMC and DMCs could not affect the lawfulness of the agreement – If the Crown wished to fund and administer Māori Wardens through the Trust in this manner, legislative amendment or the involvement and consent of NZMC and DMCs was required –  

Court declared respondents acted unlawfully in entering the funding agreement because it encroached on the NZMC and DMCs’ exclusive power and authority to control and supervise Māori Wardens carrying out duties under the Act and Regulations – Costs reserved.  

United Kingdom Supreme Court

Corporation tax, tax deductibility, regulatory penalties, settlement payments

ScottishPower (SCPL) Ltd v Commissioners for HMRC [2026] UKSC 35 (21 October 2026) 

Successful appeal against CA decision – HMRC appealed CA finding that redress payments of about £28M made by ScottishPower Energy Retail Ltd (SPERL) under settlement agreements with the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (GEMA) were deductible in calculating trading profits for corporation tax –   

SPERL investigated by Ofgem on behalf of GEMA for serious breaches of licence conditions and obligations under the Electricity and Gas (Community Energy Savings Programme) Order 2009 – GEMA indicated it would impose a significant fine on SPERL as punishment for breaches, but ultimately entered into settlement agreement – Under settlement agreement SPERL admitted breaches, agreed to make redress payments to customers and charities, and paid a nominal fine of £1 under each settlement – ScottishPower argued redress payments were not penalties and so were deductible as expenses incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of its trade under s 54(1)(a) Corporation Tax Act 2009 (CTA) –   

First Tier Tribunal found redress payments were punitive and therefore non-deductible, but compensatory payments of £554,013 could be deducted – Upper Tribunal disagreed with distinction between compensatory and punitive payments – Found no amount was deductible, as all formed part of a package paid in lieu of penalties – CA allowed ScottishPower’s appeal – Found rule regarding non-deductibility of penalties was judge-made so should be construed narrowly and not extended judicially to sums that are not strictly penalties – ScottishPower were entitled to deduct full amount of redress payments –   

SC found penalties not deductible as they were not incurred for purposes of trade within s 54(1)(a) CTA - Redress payments were akin to penalties so equally not incurred for purposes of trade – Redress payments not truly voluntary, since had settlement not been agreed, a penalty of similar magnitude would have been borne – The £554,013 compensatory payments should not be treated differently, being part of overall package paid in lieu of penalty –   

Appeal allowed – decision of Upper Tribunal restored. 

England and Wales High Court 

Limitation, reasonable diligence

White v Uber London Ltd [2026] EWHC 2651 (Comm) (19 October 2026)

Determination of limitation issue – Alleged that Uber companies conspired to injure over 13,000 claimants (London black-cab drivers) by unlawful means between 2012 and 2018 – Alleged unlawful means included allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations and deliberate and dishonest non-disclosure to the licensing authority with respect to Uber’s booking and operating system, and aspects of Uber’s use of certain technologies – Preliminary issue whether claims were time-barred pursuant to s 32 Limitation Act 1980 –

Under s 32(1), time does not run until the claimant discovers, or could with reasonable diligence discover, the relevant fraud or concealment – In a fraud case, claimant must know enough to plead the claim with a sufficient evidential basis; certainty or knowledge that the claim will succeed is unnecessary – Reasonable diligence is objective but applied to the actual claimant, and requires reasonable attentiveness followed by a reasonably diligent investigation – Burden lies on claimant –

Held claimants could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered sufficient facts to plead their claims before 25 June 2018 – Transport for London decision letter refusing renewal of Uber London’s licence supplied credible detail about Uber’s representations, their falsity etc – Any reasonably diligent claimant could have assembled a viable claim within approximately four to six weeks after publication of the decision letter – Actual knowledge was not determinative – Claimants could have discovered the alleged fraud and/or deliberate concealment more than six years before the first claim form was issued – All claims were time-barred – Decision reaffirms that limitation commences when a claimant has sufficient information to pursue their claim, and it is not postponed while they seek legal advice on prospects.

Canada Supreme Court 

Torts, medical negligence, factual causation, remoteness of damage  

Hemmings v Padmore 2026 SCC 34 (23 October 2026)  

Unsuccessful appeals against Ontario CA decision dismissing claims against obstetrician (P) and Hospital, but upholding liability of anaesthesiologist (J), for brain injury suffered during emergency caesarean section –  

H suffered cardiac arrest after anaesthetic complications during emergency caesarean section, leaving her with severe permanent brain damage – H and her family sued medical practitioners and Hospital – Trial judge found P, H’s obstetrician for most of the pregnancy, liable for failing to advise of pregnancy risks and option of termination, and J liable for converting to general anaesthetic before exhausting other reasonable options to calm H – Hospital held vicariously liable for nurse who gave H telephone advice 10 days before delivery without reviewing her records, and directly liable for its management of her records – On-duty obstetrician O was found in breach but not liable, as her conduct was not a factual cause and the injuries could not have been anticipated by her (finding not appealed) – CA set aside liability of P and Hospital for inconsistent remoteness findings, and upheld liability of J –   

SC majority dismissed both appeals – Found factual causation and remoteness were analytically distinct – Factual causation requires proof on balance of probabilities that but for the breach the injury would not have occurred, which may require an explicit counterfactual analysis in complex cases – Remoteness was a normative inquiry, a question of mixed fact and law, asking whether injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the breach – For injury to be reasonably foreseeable there must have been real risk that that type of injury could occur – Risk must be sufficient in that a reasonable person in defendant’s position would not brush it off as far-fetched and would have taken reasonable precautions to prevent it – Preferred “remoteness” to “legal causation” –

Found Trial judge erred on remoteness for P and the nurse, failing to consider what risk of anaesthetic complications was foreseeable to each on the information then available – inconsistent with finding that O, who had more information at delivery, could not have foreseen the injuries – Injuries too remote from P’s and nurse’s conduct, so claims against P and Hospital properly dismissed – On J’s appeal, trial reasons were factually and legally sufficient – Negligence and outcome closely connected in time and evidence showed reasonable efforts would likely have calmed H –  

SC minority, dissenting in part, would have restored judgment against P – Remoteness asks whether injury falls within scope of unreasonable risk that made conduct negligent, a risk-based approach functionally equivalent to reasonable foreseeability – Agreed with majority on findings against Hospital and J –  

Appeals dismissed without costs.