New Zealand Law Society - Courts roundup 5 November - 11 November 2026

Courts roundup 5 November - 11 November 2026

Decisions, proceedings and news from the courts in some common law jurisdictions in the past week.

Book on stand in Wellington High Court

New Zealand Court of Appeal

Appeals against sentence, methamphetamine importation, knowledge, starting point, guilty plea reduction, role

Toleafoa v R [2026] NZCA 537 (6 November 2026)  

Successful appeals by T and A against sentences for methamphetamine importation offending – Both pleaded guilty to the methamphetamine offending and to participating in an organised criminal group – Members of the Comanchero MC gang planned to import methamphetamine concealed in thresher machines – A total of 198.2 kg at 80 per cent purity was seized – T was arrested at the site while attempting to access the internal components of the machines – A acted as a lookout and conducted surveillance – A also pleaded guilty to charges of possessing MDMA and cocaine for supply – DCJ sentenced T to 11 years 7 months' imprisonment – DCJ found T knew of the methamphetamine and adopted a starting point of 18 years – Applied reductions of 15 per cent for the guilty plea, 15 per cent for personal circumstances and 5 per cent for the impact of imprisonment on his daughter – DCJ sentenced A to 9 years' imprisonment – Adopted starting point of 14 years for the methamphetamine offending with a 2 year uplift for the other drug offending – Applied reductions including 10 per cent for the guilty plea and 6 months for time on bail –  

T argued DCJ was wrong to find full knowledge and that the starting point was excessive – T also argued the 15 per cent guilty plea reduction was too low – CA agreed with DCJ on knowledge – There was no reasonable possibility that T did not know about the importation or its likely scale – Finding rested on evidence directly connecting T to the heart of the operation and was not speculation – CA held a starting point of 18 years was within range – Considered that with the information now before it DCJ may have allowed 20 per cent for the guilty plea given the delay in the Crown responding to the amended summary of facts – This lowered the end sentence for T to 10 years 9 months – A argued the starting point was excessive because DCJ attributed features of the co-defendants to him and overstated his role – A also argued addiction was not considered and that the other offending was double counted – CA found A played a very limited role – A undertook surveillance and a taxi function and primarily a mule role for the other offending – A received drugs and a limited amount of cash – This triggered multiple elements of the lesser role in Berkland v R and only one element of the significant role – Addiction of A needed to be reflected in the starting point – CA adopted a starting point of 12 years for the methamphetamine offending – On a totality basis a combined starting point of 14 years better reflected the overall culpability of A – This lowered the end sentence for A to 7 years 10 months –  

Appeal by T allowed and sentence of 11 years 7 months set aside and substituted for a sentence of 10 years 9 months – Appeal by A allowed and sentence of 9 years set aside and substituted for a sentence of 7 years 10 months.

Appeal against sentence, injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, disputed fact, starting point, parity

Taotahi v R [2026] NZCA 536 (5 November 2026)   

Unsuccessful appeal by T against a sentence of 3.5 years' imprisonment for injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm – T was initially charged with wounding with intent and pleaded guilty to the lesser charge on the morning of trial – T and co-offender P arrived at an address where the victim and others were waiting – T and others armed with metal cabinetry poles struck the victim at least 20 times to the head – Summary of facts said T transitioned to a crowbar and uppercut the victim – T disputed this – T also kicked and punched the victim while he was on the ground – DCJ assessed the offending as band three of R v Taueki adjusted downward to the lower maximum penalty of 10 years – DCJ adopted a starting point of 5.5 years' imprisonment for T and 4.5 years for P – DCJ applied total credit of 2 years (approximately 36 per cent) for personal mitigating factors –  

T did not challenge that credit but argued the sentence was manifestly excessive because DCJ took into account the disputed crowbar and overstated premeditation and vulnerability – T also argued the starting point did not reflect parity with P – Crown accepted that including the crowbar without a disputed facts hearing was an error – CA held the sentence was to be assessed on the basis that T was armed with a metal pole and not a crowbar – Cases relied on by T did not assist as the disputed facts there were material to whether a weapon was used at all – CA accepted the offending sat at the higher end of band two or the lower end of band three – Starting point of 5.5 years was within the available range even on a band two assessment – Five aggravating features remained even if premeditation applied only to P: extreme violence, serious injury, use of a weapon, attack to the head and vulnerability of the victim on the ground – Whether vulnerability was high or moderate did not change the analysis – Comparator cases relied on by T were not similar – On parity, T was armed with a metal pole while P was not and P inflicted no physical violence – Weapons were found at the scene and not taken there – One year difference in starting points was justified – Must be a gross and unjustifiable disparity to warrant appellate interference –  

Sentence was not manifestly excessive and was within range – Appeal dismissed.  

Insolvency, proposal to creditors, tax debt, financial relief 

Commission of Inland Revenue v Pronk as Provisional Trustee [2026] NZCA 534 (4 November 2026)  

Appeal against HC approval of G’s proposal to creditors under subpart 2, part 5 Insolvency Act 2006 (IA), despite Commission of Inland Revenue (CIR) voting against it – G, a solicitor with a long history of tax non-compliance, owed CIR about $900,000 (including $300,000 preferential debt) out of over $5M total debts, mostly owed to related parties – CIR had twice written off tax debt under the Tax Administration Act 1994 (TAA) and declined G’s latest settlement offer – Proposal offered $380,000 from a family trust, paying CIR’s preferential debt and small unrelated creditors in full, with related creditors subordinating their claims – Seven of eight voting creditors approved, including related parties –  

Where CIR was one of multiple creditors, IA proposal regime applied and CIR could be bound notwithstanding its opposition – TAA financial relief provisions and IA proposals operated in different circumstances – CIR’s statutory responsibilities to maximise revenue and protect integrity of tax system remained relevant to approval but did not prevent proposal proceeding – Proposal reasonable and calculated to benefit general body of creditors, who would receive more than in bankruptcy – Bankruptcy was protective, not punitive, and compliance concerns alone did not justify bankruptcy – CA found no error in approval – Appeal dismissed – CIR ordered to pay respondents’ costs.  

Judicial review, resource consent, non-notification, adequate information, condition uncertainty  

XRay Trust Ltd v Queenstown Lakes District Council [2026] NZCA 528 (4 November 2026)

Appeal against HC decision declining judicial review of QLDC’s non-notified decision granting Millbrook Country Club a 10-year resource consent under the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) for the annual NZ Open golf tournament – XRay Trust Ltd (XTL) owned adjoining land and had earlier given Millbrook an affected person approval (APA) for a different consent but gave none here – Millbrook’s assessment of effects on the environment (AEE) implied XTL had agreed to a spectator exclusion area – Commissioner found no person adversely affected and imposed five conditions, including catch-all condition 1 requiring compliance with the application as submitted – XTL alleged material mistake of fact, inadequate information, uncertain conditions and unreasonableness –  

Leave to adduce post-judgment correspondence declined as not cogent – Implied agreement immaterial because an APA only way agreement could be considered, Commissioner knew none was given and assessed effects on XTL – Information adequate under Discount Brands Ltd v Westfield (New Zealand) Ltd standard given detailed AEE, site visit, specialist comment and prior consented Opens; unnecessary to decide whether RMA amendments relaxed that standard – HC wrongly assumed only two days of play adjacent to XTL’s property but error immaterial – Condition 1, interpreted objectively and in context, obliged Millbrook to provide updated operations, traffic management and health and safety plans before each Open – Not uncertain; unnecessary to decide whether a heightened test applies to conditions or whether condition 5 (review power) could cure uncertainty – Less prescriptive conditions than earlier consents not irrationally inconsistent – Judge right to reject XTL's claim that the decisions were unreasonable – Appeal dismissed.  

High Court of Australia

Unreasonable verdict, circumstantial evidence, appellate review  

O'Connell v Director of Public Prosecutions [2026] HCA 41 (4 November 2026)  

Successful appeal by DPP from ACT CA – O convicted by jury of murder following death of woman who had been on bonnet of O's vehicle during altercation – Crown alleged O deliberately drove away with woman on bonnet, causing her to fall and suffer fatal head injuries – Crown alleged O was recklessly indifferent to probability of causing her death – Alternative charge was manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act –  

O appealed to CA, arguing murder verdict was unreasonable – CA allowed appeal, set aside murder conviction and substituted verdict of not guilty of murder – Subsequently substituted verdict of guilty of manslaughter –  

HC allowed DPP's appeal – Found CA erred in applying test for determining whether jury's verdict was unreasonable – Appellate court required to make full allowance for advantages enjoyed by jury, including opportunity to see and hear witnesses give evidence – Also required to assess circumstantial evidence cumulatively, rather than considering individual pieces of evidence in isolation – Question was whether, having regard to all evidence, it was open to jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of O's guilt –  

DPP's appeal allowed – Orders setting aside murder conviction and substituting manslaughter conviction set aside – Matter remitted to CA to reconsider whether murder conviction was unreasonable.

Taxation, relevant contracts, taxable wages  

Uber Australia Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2026] HCA 40 (4 November 2026)  

Unsuccessful appeal against assessment of approximately $81M in payroll tax 2015 to 2020 – Uber operated a digital rideshare system under separate contracts with drivers and riders – Drivers transported riders in their own vehicles – Uber collected fares, deducted its service fee and other charges, and remitted the balance to drivers – Appeal on basis Driver Contracts were not relevant contracts in regards to the Payroll Act 2007 (NSW) and that the remittances made to drivers were not wages –  

By majority, HC held the Driver Contracts were relevant contracts within s 32(1)(b) Payroll Tax Act 2007 (NSW) – Although drivers were not obliged to accept trip requests, once a rider was taken on board the Driver Contract obliged the driver to transport the rider directly to the specified destination – That obligation was owed to Uber, notwithstanding any concurrent obligation to the rider – Discharging it supplied work-related services to Uber as well as to the rider – Requirements concerning service quality, safety and vehicle condition reinforced that conclusion – A financial benefit to Uber alone would not establish a supply of services – An exclusion existed in s 32(2)(a) but was found not to apply as it required that performance of work was ancillary to another element of the contractual arrangement – Inherent in the relationship between the performance of work and the use of property connoted by "ancillary" was that the use of property must be of greater contractual significance and correspondingly the performance of work must be of lesser contractual significance – Majority determined the driving work was not subsidiary to the use of the vehicle – The joint reasons identified the supply of driving services, rather than the use of a car, as the primary object of the Driver Contract; both driver and vehicle were central to the service –   

Remitted fares were amounts paid for or in relation to the performance of work relating to a relevant contract under s 35(1), and were therefore deemed wages – Section 35 creates a statutory concept of wages extending beyond ordinary employment remuneration – Requisite connection existed between the driving services and the amounts remitted – Reasoning emphasised Uber’s substantive control over fares, including its power to adjust or cancel them, and rejected its characterisation of itself within the Driver Contracts as a mere “collection agent” –    

HC issued a reminder about ascribing too much weight to labels used by parties to describe their relationship – While those labels may be relevant, they are not determinative – Nature of the legal relationships between the parties to a contract turns upon the identification of the nature and content of the rights created by the contract and the identity of those parties which enjoyed those rights –  

Appeal dismissed with costs.  

England and Wales High Court

Environmental law, lynx reintroduction, dangerous animals, statutory interpretation, judicial review, delay  

R (Lynx UK Trust Community Interest Company) v Natural England [2026] EWHC 2761 (Admin) (30 October 2026)  

R sought a licence under s 16 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (WCA) for a trial release of three Eurasian lynx (large wild cat) in Kielder Forest – Lynx were a native species that had been extinct in UK for more than 1300 years – Natural England declined a full assessment because the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 (DWAA) prevented lawful release and further assessment would consume substantial public resources –   

R challenged both that interpretation and the refusal to assess its application – Challenge was based on the interaction of the DWAA and the WCA – DWAA establishes a licensing regime governing the keeping of dangerous wild animals with the dual purpose of animal welfare and public safety – Lynx are expressly included within the Schedule of the Act – WCA serves a different purpose – Section 14 prohibits the release into the wild of specified animals – Section 16 DWAA empowers the appropriate authority to grant licensing authority, conduct which would otherwise contravene s 14 WCA – R believed this exception would allow the lawful release of the lynx – Ultimately the claim was dismissed – Under s 7(1) DWAA, a person who ceased to possess an animal remained its keeper until another person became its keeper – Although deliberate release and escape were distinct concepts, release did not terminate statutory keepership or its associated obligations – A WCA licence did not displace those obligations – The Acts could operate concurrently, so there was no implied repeal –  

Permission on the second ground was refused for delay – Natural England’s decision had crystallised by 1 July 2022, whereas proceedings were issued in December 2025 – Subsequent correspondence maintaining the same position did not restart time under CPR 54.5 –  

HC nevertheless considered the merits and explained that it would have rejected that ground in any event – Natural England was entitled to consider the proposal’s legal feasibility when exercising its own licensing discretion – It could rationally decline a resource-intensive assessment where an existing legal impediment meant that the proposed release could not lawfully proceed.

United Kingdom First Tier Tribunal 

Sentencing, sexual offending, rape, celebrity status, consent

R v Brand (9 November 2026)

Sentencing for B for four sexual offences against four women between 2004 and 2009, comprising rape and sexual assault (x3) – B repeatedly exploited his fame and demonstrated arrogance and disregard for women’s autonomy and consent – Offending caused significant and lasting psychological harm, including trauma, loss of trust, workplace insecurity, addiction issues and long-term emotional effects – Judge rejected allegations for which B had been acquitted and declined to treat celebrity status itself as an aggravating factor – Court also rejected claims that victims were particularly vulnerable or that B had abused a position of trust within the meaning of the sentencing guidelines – Aggravating factors included humiliation of victims, sustained nature of offending, removal of a condom without consent and lasting harm – Mitigating factors included lack of significant previous convictions, 17 years without offending, charitable work, assistance to people with addictions and family circumstances, although limited weight was given to these factors – Applying totality principles, Court imposed concurrent sentences for the sexual assaults and a consecutive nine-year sentence for rape – B sentenced to a total of 10 years and six months’ imprisonment and made subject to indefinite notification requirements under the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

Taxation, legal privilege 

Hogan Lovells Cadwalader International LLP v Revenue and Customs [2026] UKFTT 1502 (TC) (29 October 2026)    

HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) sought three documents and associated drafts between Hogan Lovells Cadwalader International (HLI) in the UK and Hogan Lovells Cadwalader US (HLUS) under their Cooperation Agreement – Documents related to a persistent imbalance between the profits generated by the two partnerships and their partner remuneration arrangements which had tax implications – HLI claimed legal advice privilege over a set of slides by partner PG and two papers authored by US tax lawyer PF circulated to a limited number of people who needed the advice to evaluate and implement a solution – HLI claimed these documents had both commercial and legal advice dimensions arguing privilege extended not only to documents which expressly reproduced or summarised legal advice but also to documents whose disclosure might reveal, disclose or betray the trend, tenor or substance of privileged advice – HMRC disputed their legal character and contended that circulation between the two partnerships whose financial interests did not always coincide, had destroyed confidentiality; alternatively, non-privileged material should be severed –   

Deciding the matter on the papers, the judge found the documents combined both legal and commercial questions which were inseparable – Advice on how to resolve the financial imbalance could therefore qualify as privileged even if it dealt with business decisions as well as legal obligations – Commercial considerations did not exclude a relevant legal context or prevent communications from forming a continuum of legal advice – Nevertheless, each document required individual assessment of the lawyer’s capacity, purpose and content – A document was not privileged merely because it was influenced by legal advice or created against a background of such advice – Express repetition or summary was unnecessary, but disclosure had to reveal the substance of advice directly or by necessary and reasonable inference, supported by a definite and reasonable foundation rather than speculation – PG's slides contained limited severable factual material and were to be disclosed with legal advice redacted – Disclosure was deferred until expiry of the permission-to-appeal period and, if a timely application was made, stayed pending final determination of that application and any renewed application – PF’s documents including relevant drafts, were privileged and did not need to be disclosed: their commercial material and surviving non-lawyer amendments were not severable from the legal advice.  

Supreme Court of Canada

Constitutional law, division of powers, labour relations, direct and derivative federal jurisdiction   

Quebec (Attorney General) v SGS Canada Inc [2026] SCC 37 (6 November 2026)   

Unsuccessful appeal from Quebec CA on issue of whether employees providing services to federally regulated undertakings were subject to federal or provincial labour laws –

SGS provided inspection and certification services to various industries – Montréal branch employed 14 inspectors and graders working almost exclusively for 6 federally regulated grain elevators – A union applied to ALT for certification under Quebec's Labour Code – Tribunal rejected application, finding employees fell within federal labour jurisdiction – Superior Court and CA upheld decision – Quebec appealed to SC -  

SC majority dismissed appeal – Held derivative federal jurisdiction extends to employees of businesses providing services integral to federally regulated undertakings where those services form a significant part of the business – A distinct branch may be considered separately if functionally independent from wider company –  

Montréal branch functionally independent and devoted approximately 90 per cent of services to federally regulated grain elevators – Grain inspection integral to elevators operations – Accordingly, branch's labour relations fell within federal jurisdiction under doctrine of derivative federal jurisdiction – Quebec's Labour Code did not apply – Appeal dismissed.